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    Dutch companies







This paper presents the results of a survey among Dutch firms on price setting behaviour in the 
Netherlands. It aims to identify how sticky prices are, which prices are sticky and why they are 
sticky. It is part of the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network (IPN). The most distinctive 
feature of the Dutch survey is its broad coverage of the business community (seven sectors and 
seven size classes). Our primary finding is that price setting behaviour depends critically on both 
a firm’s size and the competitive environment it faces. Small firms in particular adopt more rigid 
pricing policies, and the weaker the competition a firm faces, the stickier a company’s price will 
be. Furthermore, we find that wholesale and retail prices are more flexible than those for 
business-to-business services. The survey suggests that explicit and informal contracting are the 
most important sources of price stickiness. Menu costs and psychological pricing – two 
prominent explanations of price stickiness in the literature – are of minor importance. Finally, 
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April 2006NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
 
What type of Dutch firms pursues sticky price policies, and what are the sources of that rigidity? 
These are the two main questions we investigated on the basis of a survey among 1246 Dutch 
firms, drawn from a large panel of company owners, directors and high-level management 
responsible for marketing, sales or finance. We distinguish 7 sectors (of which 6 provide services) 
and 7 company sizes. By our knowledge, we are the first to investigate pricing behaviour of small 
companies, including the smallest single-worker firms. The investigation is a part of the 
Nederlandsche Bank’s contribution to the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) and 
builds on the seminal work of Blinder (1991). The Dutch survey was carried out in May 2004. In 
a recent paper, Jonker et al. (2004) examine the degree of nominal rigidity of consumer prices in 
the Dutch economy using a large database with monthly price quotes of 49 articles during 1998-
2003. Although the survey study is based on a completely different set of information (broader 
but ‘softer’), a number of interesting similarities arise that strengthen and enrich the findings in 
both directions.  
 
Our main findings are: 
• Prices are being reviewed much more frequent than changed. About two-thirds of all firms 
review prices more than once a year and only one-third change prices more than once per year;  
• The median price duration for the Dutch business sector as a whole is 12 months; 
• Price increases occur more often than decreases. Particularly in labour intensive service sectors, 
price decreases are uncommon. The magnitude of price decreases is larger than of price rises; 
• The degree of competition is very important in shaping price setting behaviour. Under condi-
tions of weak competition, prices become stickier;  
• Prices are stickiest in small firms and most flexible in large firms. Single-worker firms are by 
far the stickiest price setters;  
• The trade sector (wholesale and retail) adopts relatively flexible pricing policies. Prices for 
business-to-business services and catering are more rigid;  
• The survey provides clear evidence of asymmetries in pricing behaviour: (worsening) market 
conditions are the main factor underlying price reductions, whereas (rising) costs are the driving 
force behind price increases; 
• Among the motives for not changing prices or delaying price changes, informal and explicit 
contracts are the most relevant. Popular explanations like menu costs and appealing prices seem 
to be unimportant. This is in line with findings for other European countries;  
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This paper uses the results of a May 2004 survey to study price setting behaviour among 
firms in the Netherlands. Our primary objective is to identify the characteristics of firms whose 
pricing policy is relatively sticky, and the sources of that rigidity. The investigation is a part of 
the Nederlandsche Bank’s contribution to the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network (IPN). 
Blinder (1991) was the first to recognize the potential of directly surveying businesses in bridging 
the gap between theory and practice. Without surveying methods, it is hard to discriminate 
between the many theories of price rigidity based on their prediction (…they all predict that 
prices are rigid…)
4. Blinder’s analysis was based on interviews with 200 American companies. A 
few others followed (for Germany see Köhler, 1996, for Sweden Apel et al., 2005 and for the UK 
Hall  et al. 2000). In the context of the IPN, nine Eurosystem national central banks (ncb´s) 
carried out nation-wide surveys
5. To our knowledge, the Dutch survey is the first attempt to 
capture the characteristics of price setting for a broad range of companies in the Netherlands. 
In our survey, over 1200 firms were asked about the characteristics of their price setting 
behaviour.  We asked about the frequency of price changes, the frequency with which prices were 
reviewed regardless of whether they were changed, and the rationale for the changes. The survey 
results allow us to examine various theories of price rigidity, including the role of implicit and 
explicit contracts, menu costs of changing prices and the costs of collecting information.   
We find that implicit contracts (where customers expect prices to remain stable) and explicit 
contracts (where a price can only be changed after renegotiation) are the most important reasons 
for delaying a price change. This is in line with findings in other EMU countries (see Fabiani et 
al. (2005)). In a recent paper, Jonker et al. (2004) examine the degree of nominal rigidity of 
consumer prices in the Dutch economy using a large database with monthly price quotes of 49 
articles during 1998-2003. Although our study is based on a completely different set of 
information, a number of interesting similarities arise. Both studies provide strong evidence that 
prices are stickiest in small firms and most flexible in large firms. Furthermore, in the survey the 
median price duration is 12 months, against 9 months in the micro-study. The reason for this 
difference might be that in our survey a broader set of prices is covered (both consumer prices 
and business-to-business prices). From our survey, we know that business-to-business prices 
change much less frequently than consumer prices. Furthermore, both studies find evidence that 
price increases occur more often than decreases and that the magnitude of price decreases is 
larger, but in the survey this difference is more pronounced.  
                                                      
4 Surveys have their shortcomings. For example, outcomes may depend on the formulation and the ordering of the 
questions or the timing of the survey. One of the interesting by-products of the IPN exercise is that the findings are 
quite robust across countries despite differences in survey techniques and differences in business cycle positions. 
5 Country-specific studies that have been conducted in the framework of the IPN are Kwapil et. al. (2005) for Austria, 
Aucremanne and Druant (2005) for Belgium, Loupias and Ricart (2004) for France, Stahl (2005) for Germany, Fabiani 
et. al. (2004) for Italy, Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) for Luxembourg, Martins (2005) for Portugal and Álvarez and 
Hernando (2005) for Spain.  
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state-dependent pricing strategies. There are also remarkable differences. The micro-study 
concludes that single-worker businesses change prices almost as often as large firms, whereas we 
do not find this in the survey. However, in our survey single-worker firms cover a much wider 
range of activities: whereas the micro-study focuses on consumer goods and services, our study 
also deals with business-to-business deliveries. Overall, the similarities strengthen the findings in 
both directions.    
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the survey set-up. In 
Section 3, we analyse and discuss the outcomes of the survey, focussing on the frequency of price 
reviews and price changes, the role of competition, firm size and type of sector (par. 3.2), price 
setting rules (par. 3.3), reasons of price stickiness (par. 3.4) and the existence of asymmetries in 
pricing behaviour (par. 3.5). Section 4 discusses the effect of EMU on price-setting behaviour and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Survey set-up  
 
The survey, carried out in May 2004 by a private company (TNS-NIPO), is based on a 
questionnaire prepared by the Nederlandsche Bank (see Appendix). The survey design builds on a 
combination of the work of Blinder (1991) and material from IPN members. The sample was 
drawn from a panel of 12,000 company owners, directors and high-level management responsible 
for marketing, sales or finance. Questionnaires were sent by email to almost 1,900 potential 
respondents, in most cases to their home email addresses. The advantage of this approach is that 
respondents can respond at a time of their own choosing. The questionnaire was pre-tested using 
a pilot sample of 200 firms. In total, TNS-NIPO received 1,246 replies; a response rate of 67%. 
Considering the specialized nature of the survey, this is very high (Apel et al. (2005) report a high 
response rate of 48.7%) but we find large differences in response rates between small and large 
companies. Excluded from our survey were the government, construction, the financial sector, the 
energy sector and farming. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample breakdown into company size and sector. To ensure that 
potentially relevant categories are sufficiently represented in our survey, the sample was stratified 
into seven sectors and seven company sizes (measured by numbers of employees). We use this 
stratification to apply a weighting scheme that renders our results representative for the 
population of firms in the Netherlands. Next to manufacturing, we distinguish six services 
sectors. The main reason for our focus on the services sector is that the Dutch economy is to a 
large extent service orientated.  In total, the service sector accounts for 80% of total employment 
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____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Business sector                      Number of      Response      
                                               respondents     rate (%) 
_____________________     __________     ________ 
 
Size                     Number of      Response  
                            respondents     rate (%) 
___________        _________   _________   
Manufacturing    219               64  1        person              230          88 
Services  1027                 67  2-4     persons          292           87 
-  Wholesale                  131               61  5-9     persons           198          84  
-  Retail food             84               62  10-19 persons       152          67 
-  Retail non-food          187               71  20-49 persons        141           57  
-  Hotel/restaurant            70               77  50-99 persons         86          56 
-  Transportation            85               54   >100  persons        147          36  










  1246 
 
        67 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
An interesting feature of our survey is that both large and small companies are included. As far as 
we know, we are the first to investigate the price setting behaviour of the smallest firms with 1, 2-
4 or 5-9 workers. This group is interesting, because small firms’ pricing behaviour is particularly 
rigid (see later). Moreover, small firms represent a substantial part of the Dutch economy: 
together they account for almost a quarter of business sector’s employment in the Netherlands.  
Figure 1A and 1B show that the sample distribution deviates substantially from the 
population composition. The difference is particularly large when taking the firms’ size 
perspective: small firms are overrepresented in the sample at the expense of large companies’ 
shares. Since the sample was stratified, we calculated the behaviour of the average Dutch firm on 
the basis of the 7x7 stratum shares in total employment. 
We asked respondents to relate the questions in the survey to either the main product or a 
typical product sold by the company. Picking a specific product is convenient for the respondent, 
 
Figure 1A - Composition sample and population by sector





Manufac Wholesale Retail-food Rtl n/food Hotel/rest. Transport Business
service
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1p 2-4p 5-9p 10-19p 20-49p 50-99p >=100
share in sample share in population share in employment
 
 
especially in cases where a company adopts different pricing strategies for different goods and 
services. In this way we retain internal consistency, preventing respondents from switching 
products as they answer the questions. First, we asked respondents whether or not their company 
pursues a single pricing policy for all of its products. On average, 28% of respondents report the 
same price setting for all products; 24% of the respondents adopt one pricing strategy for most of 
their products and 44% states that price setting varies substantially across products. Of the large 
companies in our survey, 53% apply various price setting strategies versus only 37% of small 
companies. All in all, these figures suggest that the single-product approach provides an accurate 
picture for the majority of the companies in our survey. 
 
 
3. Survey outcomes 
 
3.1 Price reviews and changes 
  In this section, three indicators are presented in order to assess the degree of price 
stickiness: the frequency of price reviews (Question 2.3), the frequency of price changes 
(Question 2.4) and the share of firms raising and lowering their prices in a given year (Question 
1.10 and 1.11). Blinder (1991) warns there is no definite evidence that prices are sticky. First of 
all, the equilibrium price level is not observable; and secondly, prices may be stable because 
underlying economic circumstances are.   
In Figure 2A below, frequencies of price changes and reviews are shown for different 
sectors. The first observation is that firms review their prices more often than they change them. 
Frequencies of price reviews and price changes differ substantially across sectors. Price reviews 
are most frequent in the wholesale and retail sectors and especially in retail food. These sectors  
9
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Manufac-turing Hotel/rest. Transport Wholesale Retail non-food Retail food Total
Reviews >once a year Changes >once a year
 
also change prices most frequently. Within the services sector, prices for business-to-business 
services are most rigid. In manufacturing, while more than two thirds of firms review prices more 
than once a year, still only 25% change them more than once a year. Both price reviews and price 
changes are least frequently observed in business services. The high relative frequency of price 
reviews suggests that the cost of collecting information is not a decisive factor in determining 
price flexibility. 
Table 2 shows the frequency of price reviews and actual price changes in the sectors that 
we distinguish. In the hotel and restaurant sector, 60% raised prices in 2003, whereas only 7% 
lowered prices. Price decreases were most common in the retail food sector, where 47% have 
lowered their price. For the Dutch economy as a whole, the median decrease is about twice the 
median increase. Moreover, almost one-third of all reported price changes in 2003 were price 
cuts. The study by Jonker et al. (2004) into Dutch CPI prices also finds that price increases occur 
more often than decreases and that on average, the magnitude of decreases is larger. Fabiani et al. 
(2005) and Dhyne et al. (2005) report similar findings. 
 





Firms that raised prices in 2003 
___________________________ 
 Firms that lowered prices in 2003 
___________________________ 








Manufacturing 39.3    3  34.6  15 
Wholesale 45.7 6 29.8 10 
Retail  food 32.4 10 47.1 10 
Retail non-food  49.5  5  18.3  10 
Hotel/rest.  59.2  5    7.0   5 
Transport  58.4  3    9.2  10 
Business services  54.0  5  18.2  10 
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1p 2-4p 5-9p 10-19p 20-49p 50-99p >=100p Total
Reviews>once a year Changes>once ayear
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, our survey covers a broad range of firm sizes. Figure 2B below 
and Table 3 show how the frequency of price reviews and actual price changes varies with firm 
size. Clearly, firms with only one employee have the most rigid prices. Only 37% of firms review 
and only 23% change more than once a year. The low frequency of price reviews by the smallest 
firms stands out in particular: of the slightly larger firms with 2-4 employees, 52% review more 
than once a year. Large firms tend to review frequently (69% do so more than once a year), yet 
only 37% change prices more than once a year. In 2003, price changes (and especially price 
decreases) were relatively rare for small firms. This confirms earlier findings by Jonker et al. 
(2004) for CPI prices in the Netherlands and is also consistent with results in Fabiani et al. (2005) 
for surveys in other countries participating in the IPN.  
 
 






firms that raised prices in 2003 
___________________________ 
 firms that lowered prices in 2003 
______________________________ 








1 employee  42.1  6  14.8  15 
2-4 44.2  6  16.0  10 
5-9 46.9  5  17.8  10 
10-19 49.1  5  16.3 10 
20-49 63.7  4  15.3 10 
50-99 51.6  5  24.0 10 
100+ 46.8  4  28.2 10 
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In the economic literature, the degree of competition is considered to be crucial in price 
setting behaviour. Under conditions of perfect competition, the individual firm is unable to decide 
its own prices: there is one unique price that clears the market and there are no price rigidities. A 
firm’s pricing decisions make sense only if it has some degree of market power. Hence market 
power is a prerequisite for price stickiness to be an equilibrium phenomenon. In New Keynesian 
models with sticky prices, firms do indeed exercise some market power (monopolistic 
competition). In highly competitive markets, companies will change their prices more often in 
response to changing market conditions or price revisions by main competitors (see for example 
Bayoumi  et. al., 2004). One might think of circumstances under which firms become more 
reluctant to change their prices when competitive pressure grows (see Section 3.4).  
Because of the central role of competition, we included a couple of questions that relate 
to competitive pressure. In general, we expect competitive pressure to rise with the number of 
competitors. This measure has its shortcomings, though. For example, even in oligopolistic 
markets with a small number of firms, competition may still be strong. Therefore, we asked 
companies about the perceived degree of competition, distinguishing severe, strong, weak and no 
competition (see Question 1.9). 
 
In our sample of 1,246 firms, competition was experienced as severe by 21%, as strong by 47%, 
as weak by 23%, while 5% experienced no competition. Figure 3 shows the relationship between 
the degree of perceived competition and frequency of price reviews and changes (see Question 
2.3 and 2.4 respectively), downward nominal rigidity of prices (Question 1.10 and 1.11) and the 
choice between fixed and variable mark-ups in price determination (Question 2.7). We find that 
price setting is much more flexible in highly competitive markets: firms operating in these 
markets review and change their prices much more frequently and apply flexible mark-ups more 
often. E.g., 20% of the firms experiencing no or weak competition say they change prices at least 
two times a year, against 40% of firms operating in highly competitive markets. According to our 
survey, one third of the respondents that experience strong competition had lowered the price of 
the main product the previous year. In markets with weak competition, on the other hand, price 
decreases were uncommon. 
 
Multivariate analysis of factors influencing the frequency of price reviews and changes 
Tables 2 and 3 indicated that firms that provide business services and small firms charge 
the most rigid prices. However, one would expect to find some degree of correlation between 
firm size and sector. For example, business services providers may be smaller, on average, than 
12
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2 or more changes a
year




Price decline in 2003
no competition weak competition strong competition severe competition
 
manufacturing firms. In order to distinguish between the size effect and the sector effect, we 
follow Blinder (1994), using an ordered logit regression to estimate the relationship between an 
ordinal dependent variable (the price review and change frequency band reported in our 
questionnaire, see Appendix, Questions 2.3 and 2.4) and a set of independent dummy variables 
that represent firms’ characteristics. Just like Blinder (1994), we find this an efficient way of 
summarizing partial correlations found in the data.  
To simplify the interpretation of the results, we report, in Tables 4A and 4B, marginal 
effects the firms’ characteristics have on the frequency of price reviews and price changes. 
Therefore, we also need to choose a hypothetical benchmark firm. Our benchmark is in 
manufacturing, has 50 or more employees and faces strong competition. The columns in the table 
represent the categories the respondents could choose from. The first row gives the estimated 
probabilities (in %) of our benchmark firm falling into each of the response categories. Each 
subsequent row gives the percentage point change in the estimated probability if one of the 
characteristics of the benchmark firm changes. For example, our benchmark firm (with 50 or 
more employees) has a 22.2% estimated probability of reviewing prices once per year. For a 
similar firm with only 1-4 employees, the estimated probability of once-yearly price reviews 
would be 32.7% (22.2+10.5). As is usual in this kind of studies (see Apel et al (2005)), the 
explanatory power of the regressions is rather low. Nevertheless, we report Pseudo R² values for 
the logit regressions and Adjusted R² values for linear regressions. 
The logit analysis broadly confirms the conclusion drawn from Figure 2A: Price changes 
and price reviews happen very frequently in the wholesale and retail (especially food) sectors, 
while the business-to-business services sector and the manufacturing sector change and review 
prices relatively infrequently. In the logit analysis we report the marginal effect of changing one 
characteristic with the others kept constant, whereas in Figures 2A and 2B the other factors also 
change. This explains the differences between the two analyses. In Figure 2A, the fraction of 
13
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firms in the wholesale sector. In Table 4A, we find that a firm in the wholesale sector with 50 or 
more employees facing strong competition reviews its prices significantly more often than a 
similarly sized manufacturing firm facing similar competition. Wholesale firms, however, tend to 
be much smaller. The conclusion from Figure 2B, that large firms review and change prices more 
often than small firms is also confirmed in Tables 4A and 4B, which show that more competition 
significantly increases the frequencies of price reviews and changes. 
 
Table 4A  -  Ordered logit regression of the frequency of price reviews (marginal effects) 
Question 2.3:   On average, how often do you check or review the adequacy of the price of product X? 






















Benchmark  11.3% 22.2% 23.5% 20.4% 10.9% 11.8% 100% 
1-4 workers  17.5  (3.8)**  10.5   (2.9)**  -4.2  (1.9)**  -9.6  (1.5)**  -6.5  (0.1)**  -7.7 (1.2)**  0 
5-9  10.7  (3.7)**    8.5   (1.9)**  -1.6  (1.6)  -6.6  (1.9)**  -4.9  (1.2)**  -6.1 (1.4)**  0 




-5.1  (1.2)** 
 
-7.7   (1.6)** 
 
-3.5  (1.1)** 
 
  2.8  (0.9)** 
 
  4.8  (1.1)** 
 
  8.8 (2.2)** 
 
0 




-9.2  (1.5)** 
 




 -2.0  (2.6) 
 





Retail non-food  -7.1  (1.4)**  -11.6  (2.0)**   -7.0  (1.7)**    2.4  (1.2)**    7.2  (1.4)**  16.2 (3.5)**  0 
Wholesale  -6.8  (1.5)**  -11.0  (2.2)**   -6.4  (1.9)**    2.6  (1.2)**    6.8  (1.5)**  14.9 (4.0)**  0 
Hotel/rest.   0.5  (2.1)      0.6  (2.4)    0.1   (0.4)   -0.3  (1.4)     0.3  (1.4)  -0.5 (2.0)  0 
Transport   1.9  (2.6)     2.2  (2.8)     0.2   (0.3)   -1.4  (1.8)  -1.2  (1.6)  -1.7 (2.2)  0 
Business svc.   3.7  (1.9)**     3.9  (1.9)**     0.1   (0.4)   -2.6  (1.3)**  -2.2  (1.1)**  -3.0 (1.5)**  0 
Pseudo R² = 0.06 
Benchmark firm: manufacturing, 50 or more employees, strong perceived competition 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 4B  -  Ordered logit regression of the frequency of price changes (marginal effects) 
Question 2.4:  On average, how many times a year do you adjust your selling price of product X? 








2-4 times per 
year 
__________ 












Benchmark     6.4%  67.6%  18.4%    2.4%    1.7%    3.5%  100% 
1-4 workers     8.0 (2.6)**    5.5 (2.3)**  -9.2 (1.8)**  -1.4 (0.3)**  -0.9 (0.3)**  -2.1 (0.5)**  0 
5-9     3.8 (2.2)**    4.7 (1.9)**  -5.7 (2.4)**  -0.9 (0.4)**  -0.6 (0.3)**  -1.4 (0.6)**  0 
10-49      4.6 (1.7)**    5.1 (1.7)**  -6.5 (1.8)**  -1.0 (0.3)**  -0.7 (0.2)**  -1.5 (0.5)**  0 
 
Tough comp.  
 




 3.7 (1.9)* 
 
  0.7 (0.4)* 
 
  0.5 (0.3)* 
 
  1.1 (0.6)* 
 
0 










  7.2 (1.4)** 
 





Retail non-food    -5.1 (1.0)**  -33.4 (4.3)**  16.3 (2.2)**    5.5 (1.1)**    4.5 (1.1)**  12.4 (2.6)**  0 
Wholesale    -5.1 (1.0)**  -33.2 (5.0)**  16.2 (2.2)**    5.4 (1.2)**    4.5 (1.2)**  12.2 (3.0)**  0 
Hotel/rest.    -2.5 (1.1)**   -8.6 (4.5)*    6.6 (3.1)**    1.3 (0.7)*    1.0 (0.5)*    2.3 (1.2)*  0 
Transport    -2.5 (1.2)**   -8.5 (4.8)*    6.5 (3.3)*    1.3 (0.8)*    1.0 (0.6)*    2.2 (1.3)*  0 
Business svc    -0.0 (1.1)   -0.0 (2.5)    0.0 (2.3)    0.0 (0.4)    0.0 (0.3)    0.0 (0.1)  0 
Pseudo R² = 0.07 
Benchmark firm: manufacturing, 50 or more employees, strong perceived competition 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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  We have asked firms how they determine the price for their main product. All possible 
answers are listed in the appendix (Question 2.7). In the analysis, we focus on the most important 
five answer categories. As in the previous section, we distinguish by sector and by size (Tables 5 
and 6). It is clear that in most sectors and in the Dutch economy as a whole, most firms apply a 
variable markup to their costs. In the transport sector, the largest group consists of firms that link 
their price to other prices. In retail non-food the fixed markup dominates and in retail food the 
competitors’ price is important. 
 
























Manufacturing  27.9   39.4  21.2 6.7 3.3  1.5 
Wholesale  24.2   52.6   21.3   0.0   1.4  0.5 
Retail food  23.5   30.2   40.2   1.9   2.0  2.2 
Retail non-food  30.5   27.3   28.4   1.9   9.8  2.1 
Hotel/rest.  24.4   33.2   18.7   9.4   5.5  8.8 
Transport  21.3   19.8   14.9   24.6   15.0 4.4 
Other services  17.7   34.8   18.2   19.4   4.8  5.2 
Total  23.9   35.4   21.6   10.2   5.5  3.5 
 
 
























1 worker  23.1 18.8 34.1  7.0 9.7  7.3 
2-4  33.9  27.6 18.9  9.6  5.7 4.4 
5-9  35.5  30.5 17.5  8.4  6.2 1.9 
10-19  29.6  33.8  12.9 11.0 5.9  6.8 
20-49  18.5  36.7  27.1   6.8   3.6  7.3 
50-99  29.0  28.9 20.5  16.1  4.4 1.2 
100+  19.3  40.2  22.1 10.8 5.6  2.0 
Total  23.9 35.4 21.6  10.2  5.5  3.5 
 
 
The single-employee firms stand out in the way they determine prices. Where the overall 
picture shows that smaller firms tend to apply fixed markups and large firms variable markups, 
single-employee firms appear to determine their price by looking at competitors’ prices. We 
apply a multinomial logit regression to analyze which factors influence the way a firm determines 
its price (Table 7).  
Again, we take as our benchmark a manufacturing firm with 50 or more employees facing strong 
competition. The probability of our benchmark firm applying a variable markup to its costs is put  
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Table 7 - Multinomial logit regression of price determination (marginal effects) 
(percentage points, unless stated else) 
 





















Benchmark   27.0%  39.9%  22.3%   6.9%   2.9%   1.0%  100% 
1 worker     4.3  (8.7)  -20.0 (6.9)**  15.8 (8.7)*  -4.0 (2.1)*   1.7 (2.6)   2.1 (2.3)  0 
2-4    15.6  (5.6)**  -11.7 (4.9)**  -4.2 (4.0)  -0.8 (2.1)  -0.1 (1.2)   1.3 (1.3)  0 
5-9   15.8  (6.1)**   -9.2  (5.5)*  -6.0 (4.2)  -0.6 (2.5)   0.1 (1.4)  -0.1 (0.8)  0 
10-49     2.7  (3.9)   -3.7  (3.9)    0.8 (3.3)  -1.2 (1.6)  -0.4 (0.9)    2.5 (1.6)  0 
Tough competition    -8.5  (3.1)**     9.4  (3.8)**   1.4 (3.1)  -2.4 (1.5)   0.8 (1.1)  -0.7 (0.5)  0 
Weak/no competition     7.8  (3.8)**   -7.2  (3.9)*  -6.1 (3.0)**    3.5 (2.1)*    1.2 (1.3)   0.7 (0.6)  0 
Retail food    -5.8  (6.4)   -9.0  (7.3)  20.1 (7.6)**  -4.8 (2.7)*  -1.2 (2.0)   0.7 (1.7)  0 
Retail non-food    -0.3  (4.6)   -9.7  (4.9)**   8.8 (4.8)*  -4.7 (2.0)**   5.7 (2.7)**   0.2 (0.9)  0 
Wholesale    -6.4  (4.5)  15.6  (5.6)**   0.3 (4.7)  -6.9 (1.7)**  -1.7 (1.3)  -0.8 (0.6)  0 
Hotel/restaurants    -6.6  (4.7)   -0.6  (6.1)   0.1 (5.2)    2.3 (3.3)   2.1 (2.4)   2.7 (1.7)  0 
Transport    -5.8  (5.4)  -20.2 (5.4)**  -6.8 (4.9)  20.4 (5.9)**   9.4 (3.9)**   3.1 (2.3)  0 
Business services  -11.8  (3.4)**    -1.1 (4.3)  -3.4 (3.5)  13.4 (3.1)**   1.1 (1.4)   1.7 (1.0)*  0 
Pseudo R² = 0.07 
Benchmark firm: manufacturing, 50 or more employees, strong perceived competition 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
at 40%. We find that larger firms tend to use a variable markup while smaller firms use a fixed 
markup. As firms perceive stronger competition, the variable markup becomes a more important 
strategy. Linking to other prices becomes less important with growing competition and tends to 
be more important for transport or business services firms. In business servicing labour costs are 
likely to play an important role. In the transport sector, fuel costs are another relevant factor. The 
dummy for single-employee firms shows that they tend to follow competitors’ prices, even if 
corrected for perceived competition and sector. 
We also asked firms (Question 2.2) whether they adjust their prices at regular intervals 
(time-dependent) or in response to specific events (state-dependent). Our benchmark firm applies 
a state-dependent price adjustment strategy with a 39% probability. Looking at the marginal 
effects, it is remarkable that if we change the size of the benchmark firm from ‘50 or more’ to 
‘1-4’ employees, almost 60% is estimated to apply state-dependent pricing. Stronger perceived 
competition encourages companies to adapt prices either on a daily basis or on a combined 
time/state dependent basis (Table 8). The sector dummies show that most wholesale and retail 
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Benchmark    1.5%   30.4%   29.1%   39.1%  100% 
1-4 workers  -0.8 (0.5)   -4.8 (4.0)  -15.0 (3.4)**   20.6 (4.5)**  0 
5-9  -1.0 (0.6)   -0.3 (5.2)   -5.3 (5.0)     6.6 (5.8)  0 
10-49  -0.3 (0.4)    3.8 (3.7)   -7.3 (3.3)**     3.8 (3.9)  0 
 
Very strong competition 
 




  0.8 (3.5) 
 
 -1.9 (3.6) 
 
0 













Retail non-food    7.1 (2.6)**   -8.1 (4.2)**    1.9 (4.9)    -0.9 (4.9)  0 
Wholesale  14.4 (4.3)**   -1.1 (5.1)   -7.9 (5.0)    -5.5 (5.3)  0 
Hotel/restaurants    5.8 (2.8)   -4.4 (4.8)     4.9 (5.6)     6.3 (5.2)  0 
Transport    0.0 (1.4)  23.8 (6.4)**   -5.5 (5.9)  -18.4 (5.4)**  0 
Business services    0.4 (1.0)    4.5 (3.9)   -0.8 (4.0)    -4.1 (4.0)  0 
Pseudo R² = 0.06 
Benchmark firm: manufacturing, 50 or more employees, strong perceived competition 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
 
3.4 Reasons for price stickiness 
 
Firms may have several reasons for being reluctant to change prices. The economic 
literature provides many explanations for sticky prices. Table 9 lists eight popular theories that 
were evaluated in our survey. The table provides the average scores and a brief explanation for 
each theory. The Dutch results are in line with results for the euro area (Fabiani et al., 2005): 
implicit and explicit contracts play an important role in delaying price changes, whereas menu 
costs appear to be unimportant.  
In Table 10, we analyze which of a firm’s characteristics influence the importance it 
assigns to each of the theories for price stickiness. We have performed an OLS regression of the 
score given to a certain theory of price stickiness (listed in the first column) on a set of firm’s 
characteristics (dummies for size, perceived competition and sector). The first row gives the 
predicted score for our benchmark company (manufacturing sector, 50 or more employees, strong  
 
Table 9 - Importance of theories of price stickiness 
(Average scores and standard deviations, scale: 1=irrelevant to 4=very important) 
Reasons not to change 
_____________________ 






Implicit contracts  Customers expect supplier to keep prices as stable as possible  2.66 0.78 
Nominal contracts  Prices can only be changed when contract is re-negotiated  2.57 0.88 
Judging quality by price  Lowering prices might mistakenly be interpreted as quality loss  2.34 0.84 
Temporary shocks  Fear that one may need to revise the price in opposite direction  2.34 0.81 
Co-ordination failure  Fear that competing firms will not change their price  2.22 0.79 
Change non-price factors  Instead of changing prices, prefer to change other conditions  2.07 0.82 
Pricing thresholds  Prices are set at attractive psychological thresholds  1.80 0.80 
Menu costs  Menu costs of changing prices are high  1.71 0.77 
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remarkable result is that for small firms implicit contracts are, ceteris paribus, a more important 
reason not to adjust prices than for large firms. Explicit contracts, however, are more important to 
large firms. Furthermore, implicit and explicit contracts are less important in the retail sector 
(compared to manufacturing), whereas attractive prices and menu costs are more important in 
retail (although at a low level, see Table 10). In the hotel/restaurant sector, the explicit contract is 
a much less important reason for not changing prices and the fear that a price reduction will be 
associated with a reduction in quality is important. 
 
 
Table 10 - Determinants of the importance of theories for price stickiness (marginal effects) 
(Scale 1=irrelevant to 4=very important) 
 












Score for benchmark firm    2.78    2.67   2.18   2.35 
1-4 workers  -0.24 (0.08)**   0.15 (0.08)**   0.13 (0.08)   0.02 (0.08) 
5-9  -0.21 (0.11)**   0.05 (0.10)   0.13 (0.11)   0.02 (0.10) 
10-49  -0.08 (0.07)   0.09 (0.06)   0.12 (0.07)*   0.11 (0.07)* 
 




 0.07 (0.06) 
 
 0.01 (0.06) 
 
-0.12 (0.06)* 








 0.40 (0.14)** 
 
 0.16 (0.13) 
Retail non-food  -0.31 (0.09)**  -0.21 (0.09)**   0.08 (0.09)  -0.01 (0.09) 
Wholesale    0.04 (0.10)    0.03 (0.09)  -0.02 (0.10)  -0.03 (0.09) 
Hotel/rest.  -0.54 (0.10)**  -0.29 (0.10)**   0.20 (0.10)*  -0.09 (0.10) 
Transport    0.10 (0.12)   0.07 (0.11)  -0.07 (0.12)  -0.10 (0.11) 
Business services    0.06 (0.07)  -0.02 (0.07)   0.10 (0.07)   0.06 (0.07) 
Adjusted R²    0.08   0.01   0.01   0.00 
Benchmark firm: manufacturing, 50 or more employees, strong perceived competition 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 10 - Determinants of the importance of theories for price stickiness (ctd.) 
 












Score for benchmark firm    2.30    2.27    1.67     1.62 
1-4 workers  -0.15 (0.08)*  -0.37 (0.08)**    0.07 (0.08)  -0.19 (0.07)** 
5-9  -0.05 (0.10)  -0.29 (0.10)**  -0.03 (0.10)  -0.01 (0.09) 
10-49  -0.08 (0.06)  -0.13 (0.07)*    0.07 (0.06)  -0.06 (0.06) 
 
Very strong competition 
 















 0.59 (0.13)** 
 
  0.37 (0.12)** 
Retail non-food    0.08 (0.09)    0.03 (0.09)   0.60 (0.09)**    0.51 (0.08)** 
Wholesale    0.01 (0.09)  -0.00 (0.09)    0.12 (0.09)    0.24 (0.09)** 
Hotel/rest.  -0.11 (0.10)  -0.46 (0.10)**   0.05 (0.10)    0.14 (0.09) 
Transport  -0.26 (0.11)**    0.01 (0.11)    0.25 (0.11)**     0.32 (0.10)** 
Business services  -0.02 (0.07)  -0.16 (0.07)**   0.04 (0.07)  -0.06 (0.06) 
Adjusted R²   0.03    0.04   0.07    0.08 
Benchmark firm: manufacturing, 50 or more employees, strong perceived competition 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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3.5   Asymmetries of price reactions 
 
In the previous sections we have discussed price stickiness in several sectors of the 
economy and the reasons why prices are sticky. In this section we discuss the presence of 
asymmetric price responses of Dutch firms to shocks (see Questions 2.8 and 2.9 for price raising 
respectively price lowering factors). We take a closer look at which factors are associated with, 
respectively, upward and downward price revisions.  We also investigate the role of competition 
and firm size in greater detail.  
 
Asymmetries and competition 
In our survey we find evidence of asymmetric responses to shocks in the Dutch business 
sector (Table 11). The upward effect of rising costs proves significantly stronger than the 
downward effect of falling costs. Asymmetric responses are strongest for labour cost shocks. 
Moreover, for firms perceiving weak competition reported cost asymmetries are significantly 
larger. Similar results are found in most other countries. See Hall et al. (2000) for the UK and 
Fabiani et al. (2004) for Italy. 
Asymmetric responses are also observed when market conditions change. In competitive 
markets, company prices respond more strongly to price depressing conditions such as weakening 
demand and lower competitor prices than they do to price raising conditions, e.g. strengthening 
demand or higher competitor prices. Under weak competition, asymmetric price responses 
vanish. These results are very interesting, with important implications for monetary policy 
making, but also for macroeconomic model building in which asymmetries are often ignored.   
 
Table 11 - Survey evidence of  asymmetries 
(Scale 1=irrelevant to 4=very important) 
Average score 








   Prompting a price 
___________________ 
Prompting a price 
___________________ 






















Cost factors               
1  Raw materials  2.62  2.13  0.49 2.70  2.23  0.47 2.43 1.86  0.57 
2  Labour costs  2.85  2.18  0.67 2.87  2.19  0.68 2.79 2.10  0.69 
3  Other costs  2.64  2.09  0.55 2.59  2.12  0.47 2.75 2.06  0.69 
                 Average  2.70  2.13  0.57 2.72  2.18  0.54 2.66 2.01  0.65 
               
Market conditions               
4  Demand  2.35  2.57  -0.22 2.41  2.72  -0.31 2.38  2.54  -0.16 
5  Competitor price  2.58  2.70  -0.12 2.72  2.90  -0.18 2.43  2.48  -0.05 
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Compared to the surveys in other countries, the Dutch price setting survey includes 
detailed information about small firms, including the single-worker ones. There are quite a 
number of single-worker firms in the Netherlands (around 40% of all businesses, accounting for 
4% of employment). The share of the single-worker firms offering business-to-business services 
is 56%, 19% are active in retail non-food, 8% in manufacturing, 7% in wholesale and 10% in 
transport, retail food or hotel/restaurant. In section 3.2 we presented evidence that companies with 
only one employee charge the most rigid prices. For example, only 1 in 5 of these firms changes 
prices more than once a year and price decreases are relatively rare.  
Pricing by single-worker companies is unusual not only in comparison with large firms, 
but also compared to other small firms. In Figure 4 and 5, this is shown for asymmetries. Price 
responses to cost shocks by single-worker firms are by far the weakest, both in case of downward 
and upward pressure. The response to changes in demand or competitors’ prices is stronger, 
however, especially under worsening market conditions; this is more in line with the response of 
larger companies. 
This exceptional price setting behaviour can be explained by the special characteristics of 
single-worker firms. To begin with, the employer and employee generally is one and the same 
person, which explains why they are relatively insensitive to labour cost shocks. Secondly, for 
many single-worker firms, raw materials are of little importance. Finally, the weak 
responsiveness to financial costs can be explained by the fact that small companies rely largely on 
internal financial resources.  
To sum up: Most single-worker companies change their prices only occasionally, but 
when they do they set prices in accordance with market conditions. 
 
Figure 4 - Price raising factors in small Dutch firms
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4.   Special topics 
 
Price setting and EMU 
EMU increases market transparency. Prices between EMU member countries can be 
better compared and price differentials are no longer disturbed by exchange rate fluctuations. This 
is bound to promote competition and affect pricing behaviour sooner or later. When asked about 
the impact of EMU on pricing policies, a majority of our respondents replied that EMU had had 
no major impact on pricing policies (see Question 2.11). About 70% of the respondents operating 
abroad reported that their pricing policies had not changed yet; 10% expected EMU to affect their 
pricing policy in the near future. Another 10% of the respondents reported that price 
discrimination between countries has become more difficult because of the euro and a final 10% 
replied that they had become less sensitive to exchange rate movements. Firms perceiving 
stronger competition or bigger companies reported a heavier impact under EMU. All in all, the 
survey suggests that changes in pricing behaviour in response to EMU are likely to be gradual
6. 
Faber and Stokman (2004) draw the same conclusion on the basis of price dispersion 
developments within EMU. 
 
Pass-through of price stickiness in production chains   
Price stickiness might have a major impact on macro-economic variables, even if it is not 
widespread at the micro-level. One explanation for this is that price stickiness in one part of the 
production chain may be passed on to the next (see e.g. Huang and Liu, 2001).   
We asked respondents whether they synchronize their own price changes with those of their 
suppliers (see Question 2.5). About 22% of all respondents report that they do so often or always, 
35% say occasionally and 37% say they do not. Differences between sectors are large: in 
                                                      
6 In a number of Dutch sectors operating in local markets, the euro changeover led initially to substantial price rises. 
See for example Folkertsma, Van Renselaar and Stokman (2002) who provide evidence that short-run pricing 
behaviour had changed in response to the introduction of EMU.     
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with 1 in 6, on average, for other sectors.  
Next, we asked to what extent customers take respondents’ timetables for price changes 
into account According to the respondents, 9% of customers follow their suppliers’ timing of 
price changes. Larger companies report substantially higher numbers (19%).       
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
          Our survey provides interesting new insights into the price setting behaviour of Dutch 
companies. Because of its broad coverage, we were able to identify some basic characteristics of 
sticky-price companies. First of all, we find for all sectors and all firm sizes that price reviews are 
much more frequent than price changes. This suggests that the cost of collecting information is 
not a decisive factor in determining price rigidity. For the Dutch economy as a whole, about two-
thirds of all firms review prices more than once per year and one-third change prices more than 
once per year. 
We also find that the degree of competition is very important in shaping price setting 
behaviour. Generally speaking, under conditions of weak competition, producer prices become 
much stickier. Company size is also found to be relevant. Our study is the first to shed light on 
the pricing behaviour of small companies (1-9 employees). Together they make up a significant 
part of the business community. Single-worker firms are by far the stickiest and large firms the 
most flexible price setters.  
Next to size and competition, sector matters: the trade sector (wholesale and retail) adopts 
relatively flexible pricing policies. Prices for business-to-business services and catering are the 
most rigid.  
Furthermore, there is clear evidence of asymmetries in pricing behaviour. Here, a 
distinction in the type of shock is relevant (cost shocks or shocks in market conditions). Among 
the motives for not changing prices or delaying price changes, informal and explicit contracts are 
the most relevant. Menu costs and appealing prices are unimportant. This is in line with findings 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
The European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks in EMU have launched a joint research project on 
price setting by European companies. Together, they are responsible for price stability in the euro area. Information 
about pricing behaviour is vital to the preparation and conduct of monetary policy.  De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) is 
involved in surveying Dutch companies on this topic. The information you provide will only be used for research 
purposes. TNS-NIPO does not provide company specific information like respondent or branch names. DNB 
guarantees strict confidentiality of your answers.  Answering the questionnaire will take you about 10 minutes.  We are 




0  AVAILABLE BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
0.1  Position of respondent in the company 
 
0.2  Sector  
-  Manufacturing 
-  Business services 
-  Wholesale 
-  Retail (food/non-food/catering) 
-  Transportation 
-  Other 
 
0.3  Number of employees including owner 
-  1 person 
-  2-4 persons 
-  5-9 persons 
-  10-19 persons 
-  20-49 persons 
-  50-99 persons 
-  100 or more persons  
 
 
1   GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1.1   Are you in a position to provide information on price setting within your company? 
        -  Yes 
        -  No (end of survey)               
 
1.2   Does your company pursue a single pricing policy for all products?  
        -  Yes, policy is basically the same for all our products 
        -  Yes, for the greater part of our product range 
        -  No, depends on the type of product  
        -  Don’t know/no answer  
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Please answer the following questions for the main product or one typical product sold by your 
company, referred to in the questionnaire as product X. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
1.3  What product (X) do you have in mind? 
 
1.4   What percentage of your sales is accounted for by product X. A rough estimate suffices. 
     
1.5   In what markets do you sell your main products? (more answers allowed) 
        - Local market 
        - Regional market 
        - National market 
        - Foreign markets 
 
1.6   What is your main market for product X? Please tick only one answer  
        - Local market 
        - Regional market 
        - National market 
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        - …..% 
        - Don’t know / no answer    
 
1.8  Could you roughly indicate the number of competitors for your main product on the Dutch market?  
       Please tick only one answer  
        - None  
        - 1 
        - 2 to5  
        - 5 to 20 
        - 20 or more 
        - Don’t know / no answer 
 
1.9  How strong is the competition you experience for product X? 
         -  Severe competition 
         -  Strong competition 
         -  Weak competition 
         -  No competition 
         -  Don’t know / no answer 
 
1.10  Did you raise or lower the selling price of product X last year? 
-  Raised it 
-  Lowered it 
-  Left it unchanged 
-  Don’t know / no answer 
 
 
1.11  By what percentage has your selling price changed in 2003 compared to 2002? 
-   ….% 




2   PRICE SETTING BEHAVIOUR: TIMING AND DETERMINANTS 
 
2.1 Do you decide the price of product X independently or is it dictated by head office or government rules? 
       -  Determine prices myself 
       -  Partially dependent on suggested prices/prices of head office 
       -  Fully dependent on suggested prices/prices of head office 
       -  Price is to a large extent regulated by government  
       -  Other… 
       -  Don’t know/ no answer 
 
2.2   Do you adjust the selling price of product X at fixed time intervals? 
        -  Yes, daily 
        -  Yes, periodically (e.g. once a week, month, year) 
        -  Generally periodic, but occasionally in response to specific events (large shocks for example)     
        -  No, depends fully on specific events 
 
2.3  On average, how often do you check or review the adequacy of the price of product X? 
- Occasionally 









2.4  On average, how many times a year do you adjust your selling price of product X?    
- Occasionally (less than once a year) 
- Once a year 
- 2-4 times per year 
- 5-11 times per year 
- 12 times per year (monthly) 
- More often 
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       - No 
       - Sometimes (e.g. in case of major price change by supplier) 
       - Often 
       - Always 
       - Don’t know / no answer   
 
2.6   Do customers align the timing of their price changes to yours?  
       - No 
       - Sometimes (e.g. in case of major price change by you) 
       - Often 
       - Always 
       - Don’t know / no answer   
 
2.7  How do you calculate the price of your "main product"?   
        - a fixed mark-up is applied to unit variable costs (cost of labour and other inputs)  
        - a variable mark-up is applied tot unit variable costs, depending on market conditions 
        - to a large degree on the basis of my competitors’ prices 
        - linked to another price (like wages) 
        - dictated by our customer(s) 
        - linked to price index 
        - fixed by supplier 
        - differs per customer 
        - other  
        - don’t know/ no answer  
 
2.8  Which factors would be likely to cause an increase in the price of your "main product"?  
       Attribute a value of 1 (irrelevant) to 4 (very important)  
       -  An increase in the cost of labour  
       -  An increase in the cost of raw materials 
       -  An increase in financial costs  
       -  An increase in other production costs  
       -  An increase in demand  
       -  An increase in competitors’ prices  
       -  An increase in quality of the product 
       -  A cash flow or financing problem  
 
 
2.9  Which factors would be likely to cause a decrease in the price of your "main product"?  
       Attribute a value of 1=irrelevant to 4=very important to each  
       -  A decrease in the cost of labour  
       -  A decrease in the cost of raw materials 
       -  A decrease in financial costs  
       -  A decrease in other production costs  
       -  A decrease in demand  
       -  A decrease in competitors’ prices  
       -  A decrease in quality of the product 
       -  Liquidity surpluses  
 
 
2.10 Which of the following factors might delay price changes for product X?  
        Attribute a value of 1=irrelevant to 4=very important to each 
        -  The presence of a formal contract: prices can only be changed when the contract is re-negotiated 
        -  Our customers expect us to keep prices as stabile as possible 
        -  Lowering prices might mistakenly be interpreted as quality loss   
        -  Fear that competing firms will not adjust their price  
        -  Fear that you may need to revise the price in the opposite direction  
        -  Prices are set at ‘appealing’ thresholds  
        -  Presence of high menu costs of changing prices (e.g. printing new catalogues, costs of adjusting price tags ..) 
        -  Instead of changing prices, prefer to change other conditions like terms-of-payment, service level  
        -  Other (please specify if possible) 
 
2.11  The introduction of the euro has enhanced comparability of prices between EMU member countries. 
        Has this affected your price setting policy? 
         -  Had no or hardly any effect 
         -  Not yet, but expect this to be the case in the future     
         -  More difficult to differentiate prices across EMU countries  
         -  Less sensitive to exchange rate movements 
         -  Other 
         -  Don’t know / no answer 
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